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ABSTRACT
Metaphysicians still discuss about the number of things. According to monists, there 
is one thing, either fundamental (Priority Monism) or exclusionary (Existence Monism). 
According to pluralists, there are many things, either fundamental (Priority Pluralism) or 
exclusionary (Existence Pluralism). The claims of cardinality of these views are, presum-
ably, metaphysical claims, which means, presumably, that they are necessarily true, if true 
at all. In this paper, I unravel a common pattern of some of the main arguments used by 
the parties involved and challenge their assumptions. By doing this, I intend to show that 
those arguments are all equally impotent to settle the question about the number of 
things because their conclusions are not necessary truths as they are meant to be. These 
views, at the very most, can be presented and defended as consistent ways of saying how 
many things, apparently, might be.
Keywords: cardinality, fundamentality, existence, monism, pluralism, nihilism.
RESUMO
Metafísicos ainda discutem sobre o número das coisas. De acordo com os monistas, há 
uma coisa, seja fundamental (Monismo Prioritário) ou excludente (Monismo de Existên-
cia). De acordo com os pluralistas, há muitas coisas, seja fundamental (Pluralismo Prioritá-
rio) ou excludente (Pluralismo de Existência). As alegações de cardinalidade dessas visões 
são, presumivelmente, afirmações metafísicas, o que significa, presumivelmente, que el as 
são necessariamente verdadeiras, se são verdadeiras. Neste artigo, desvelo um padrão 
comum de alguns dos principais argumentos usados  pelas partes envolvidas e questiono 
suas suposições. Ao fazer isso, pretendo mostrar que esses argumentos são igualmente 
impotentes para resolver a questão sobre o número das coisas, porque suas conclusões 
não são verdades necessárias como pretendem ser. Essas visões, no máximo, podem ser 
apresentadas e defendidas como formas consistentes de dizer quantas coisas, aparente-
mente, podem ser.
Palavras-chave: cardinalidade, fundamentalidade, existência, monismo, pluralismo, niilismo.
1 I am grateful to two anonymous 
reviewers for helpful comments 
and suggestions. This paper was 
written as part of my research proj-
ect Fondecyt-Iniciación 11160724 
(Conicyt, Chile).
2 Universidad de Concepción. 
Víctor Lamas 1290, Casilla 160-C, 
Concepción, Chile. E-mail: 
jsbricen@gmail.com
Arguing about the world’s 
cardinality: Priority, existence, 
and metaphysical necessity1
Argumentando sobre a cardinalidade do mundo: 
prioridade, existência e necessidade metafísica
Sebastián Briceño2
Sebastián Briceño
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 19(1):11-22, jan/apr 2018 12
The world’s cardinality
Let W be our concrete material world. Let the pps be all 
the concrete material individuals/ objects/ things (I will use 
these expressions interchangeably) that compose it. W is the 
cosmos itself; the pps are its many planets, pebbles, particles, 
etc. Now quantify over W. Are there many things or only 
one thing?
Priority Monism (PM), the view that has been cham-
pioned by Schaffer (2009, 2010), says that both the pps 
and W exist, but that W is metaphysically prior to the pps. 
The parts are grounded in the whole. Fundamentality has 
a top-down direction. In contrast, Priority Pluralism (PP) 
answers, just like PM, that both the pps and W exist, but 
with the opposite qualification: the pps are metaphysical-
ly prior to W. The whole is grounded in the parts. Funda-
mentality has a bottom-up direction. We can attribute this 
view to Kim (1993, 1998) and to Oppenheim and Putnam 
(1991).3 PP honours the Newtonian tradition that appeals 
to the smallest bodies as the building blocks of all larger 
bodies: the fundamental ontological level of W consists in 
many atomic pps, many externally related point-like indi-
viduals, presumably space-time points or point-like par-
ticles, upon which all composite individuals, including W 
itself, are grounded.
PM and PP are not the only possible answers. There 
is also Existence Monism (EM) and Existence Pluralism 
(EP). EM rejects the assumed pps. EM understands the 
pps as fictions of decomposition of W, and answers that there 
is, really, only one individual, W, which is a mereological 
simple, a metaphysical atom. Of course, without rejecting 
such assumption, EM would be a non-starter. This was, ac-
cording to some (e.g., Bennett, 2001, ch. 7), the view held 
by Spinoza (1994); it is now the view defended by Hor-
gan and Potrč (2008); and it is recognised by Rea (2001) 
as a perfectly coherent and tenable alternative. Since W is 
not a composite object, its local variation is not in virtue 
of its distinct proper parts instantiating distinct properties. 
“Rather, it is a matter of [W] itself instantiating in spa-
tiotemporally local ways various properties and relations” 
(Horgan and Potrč, 2008, p. 169). Strictly  eaking, there 
are no planets, but only W being planet-lish there-ishly. EM 
can paraphrase the talk of middle sized goods in terms of 
“complex adverbial qualifications of the world” (Schaffer, 
2007, p. 179n). Objects shorter than W are not individu-
als, but only Spinozistic finite modes or affections of W. They 
only count as individuals in virtue of distinctions of reason 
or imagination, not in virtue of real distinctions.4
In contrast, EP rejects all composite objects, including 
W itself, as fictions of composition, and answers that there 
are, really, only many pps, which are mereological simples, 
metaphysical atoms. Typically, it is the view embraced by 
compositional nihilists like Rosen and Dorr (2002), Sid-
er (2013), and van Inwagen (1990, 1994, 2002)5—though 
we should keep in mind that EM is also a variant of com-
positional nihilism, the most parsimonious available (cf. 
Schaffer, 2007). Many pps never compose a distinct object. 
What happens is that the pps instantiate lots of different 
properties and relations, they are arranged in many differ-
ent ways, but, strictly speaking, there are no planets, but 
3 Oppenheim and Putnam claim, without providing any arguments, that “there must be several levels”, and that “there must be a 
unique lowest level”, which they identify with the level of “elementary particles” (Oppenheim and Putnam, 1991, p. 409). Kim, on 
the other hand, defends a worldview that understands the world as an “array of levels”; the structure of it is given by “the mere-
ological relation being part of: entities belonging to a given layer are mereologically composed of entities belonging to the lower 
levels, and this relation generates a hierarchical ordering of the levels”; and it “carries the assumption that there is a bottom tier, 
a layer of entities that have no physically significant parts” (Kim, 1993, p. 337; cf. Kim, 1998, p. 15). For more textual evidence and 
examples, see Schaffer (2003). With qualifications, I think we can also see an instance of PP in Lewis’s “Humean Supervenience” 
thesis (1986a, 1986b). I say “with qualifications” because the attribution demands reconciling some aspects of Lewis’s thesis with 
the understanding that PP and PM, qua variants of metaphysical foundationism, have of grounding (cf. Bliss and Trogdon, 2016). 
First, Lewis’s alleged “ontologically innocent” understanding of both supervenience and composition would need to be reject-
ed, since it is incompatible with the metaphysical foundationist understanding of grounding, which takes the relata of the latter 
relation as distinct existents, in such a way that, when mapped in terms of parthood, either the whole grounds the parts (PM) 
or the parts ground the whole (PP), yet both the whole and the parts exist (more on this later). Second, we should exclude the 
possibility according to which supervenience could be understood as a symmetric relation (cf. Hall, 2016), since the metaphysical 
foundationist understanding of grounding takes it as an asymmetric relation (more on this also later). Another way to attribute PP 
to Lewis could be by appealing to his notion of “naturalness”, and understand that the relation being more natural than can play 
the same role of grounding as understood by metaphysical foundationism. But it is doubtful that Lewis understood it like that. For 
start, although he did rank properties in terms of naturalness, it does not seem that he intended to rank individuals in those very 
same terms (cf. Lewis, 1999; Hall, 2016).
4 That fragmentary understandings of W are not the results of real distinctions, but the result of distinctions of reason, seems to have 
been Spinoza’s position. Thus, he writes to Meyer: “[F]rom the fact that we separate the affections of Substance from Substance itself, 
and arrange them in classes so that we can easily imagine them as far as possible, there arises Number, whereby we delimit them. 
Hence, it can clearly be seen that Measure, Time and Number are nothing other than modes of thinking, or rather, modes of imagining” 
(Spinoza, 2002, p. 789; cf. Spinoza, 1994, Part I, Appendix).
5 I include van Inwagen as a compositional nihilist, although his position is not strictly this one. He thinks that two things never com-
pose a third thing unless this third thing is a living organism. But, leaving aside living organisms, it is quite clear that van Inwagen 
does support compositional nihilism. His concrete material world is a world of atoms and living organisms. No tables, planets or 
pebbles around.
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only some pps arranged planet-wise; there is no W, but only 
the pps arranged W-wise.6
The expression “fiction of decomposition” is bor-
rowed from Schaffer (2007). The expression “fiction of 
composition” is borrowed from Rosen and Dorr (2002). 
Before taking any further step, it is important to highlight 
the important role of these two expressions. EP and EM 
embrace compositional nihilism. Strictly speaking, ac-
cording to them, there are none of the middle-sized goods 
that populate Moorean appearances (e.g., hands, chairs, 
cars, stones, planets). But both acknowledge that we do 
need, somehow, to find a place for them in our ontology. 
Although they obviously reject the route of mereological 
complexity and metaphysical foundationism embraced by 
PP and PM, they also, at least implicitly, reject the route 
of straight eliminativism. This latter route would be mad-
ness (cf. Schaffer, 2009). Thus, EP and EM recognise the 
existence of many composite objects, such as hands and 
chairs, at least as fictions, illusions, or the like. They do so 
by adding a fictional operator (or something along these 
lines) to their existential claims about them. Thus, as it can 
be appreciated, in the debate about the number of things, 
the parties make, at least implicitly, the following restric-
tions to the existential quantifier. First, they restrict quan-
tification to our concrete material world, whose existence is 
presupposed.7 Second, they restrict quantification to what 
really exists,8 and this reality is meant to include our con-
crete material world and exclude fictions, illusions and the 
like. So, when we make these presuppositions explicit, it 
happens that PM, PP, EM, and EP do not argue about how 
many things exist simpliciter; they argue about how many 
things exist really or fundamentally at W. PM and PP both 
agree that the pps and W exist simpliciter and really; their 
disagreement is about what grounds what. EP and EM 
both agree that the pps and W exist simpliciter, but they 
disagree about which of these really exist; yet they agree 
that, once this latter question is settled, there is no ques-
tion about what grounds what, because real existents have 
equal ontological rights.
There is wide agreement among the participants of this 
debate on the idea that metaphysical claims are necessarily 
true, if true at all, and on the idea that the claims about cardi-
nality that they happen to defend or attack are indeed meta-
physical claims (cf. Rosen, 2006; Schaffer, 2010; Sider, 1993; 
Tallant, 2013; van Inwagen, 1990; Williams, 2006). A second 
basic shared commitment is the idea that, prima facie, if some-
thing is conceivable and logically possible, then it is metaphys-
ically possible—yet there is no need to think that conceivabil-
ity entails metaphysical possibility (cf. Schaffer, 2010, p. 61). 
We can state these assumptions thus:
(A1)  Metaphysical claims are necessarily true, if true at 
all. Claims about the number of things are meta-
physical claims.
(A2)  Conceivability and logical possibility are, considered 
jointly, our best guides to metaphysical possibility.
For now and for the sake of argument, let’s assume 
that PM, PP, EM, and EP collectively exhaust the possible 
answers to the question of which is the number of things. 
How can we decide between them? Not at all clear. The 
four alternatives, prima facie, make sense; at least none of 
them seems to be logically inconsistent. But since all of them 
claim to be necessarily true, if true at all, then only one of 
them can be true. Which one? PM and PP need, as a condi-
tion of sense, the existence of a fundamental layer of being. 
6 One could say that a planet is “nothing over and above” some pps arranged planet-wise, or that a planet just is some pps taken 
collectively and, conversely, that some pps taken collectively just are a planet. That is, one could embrace the idea that composition is 
identity, on the understanding that mereology, unlike set theory, is “ontologically innocent” (cf. Armstrong, 1997, p. 11-13; Baxter, 1988; 
Lewis, 1991, § 3.6). But this would not do. If we take the thesis that composition is identity in its weaker form, that is, if we understand 
that composition is like identity in many respects, but not strictly identity, the thesis is not “ontologically innocent”, because being com-
mitted to many things (some pps) and being committed to one thing (a planet) are two distinct commitments, even if they happen to 
be invariant across possible worlds. In contrast, if we take it literally, in its stronger form, the thesis is contradictory, since some parts are 
many things, that is, not one; yet a whole is one thing, that is, not many. There is no such thing as a plural object: many things are not one 
thing, composition is not identity, and composition, even when modally invariant, is not ontologically innocent, on pain of contradiction 
(cf. Priest, 2014, p. 51; Yi, 1999a, 2014). Appealing to some mechanism of plural reference represents no way out from this contradiction, 
because “[t]he machinery does not allow us to refer to objects that are plural, but to a plurality of objects. Thus, when we say that Russell 
and Whitehead wrote Principia, we are not referring to some strange object, Russell and Whitehead; we are referring to Russell and 
to Whitehead” (Priest, 2014, p. 51). It seems that the only way left is that the relation being arranged planet-wise were, as Baxter puts 
it, a “one-making relation”, that is, a relation capable of making many things one thing (cf. Baxter, 1996). But this route faces Bradley’s 
dilemma. On one hand, if we take the relation as actually relating, then we simply beg the question about how the many are one, since 
we have posited a mysterious creature to account for oneness without explaining in virtue of what it is capable of making many things 
(including itself) one thing. On the other hand, if we take the relation in itself, as distinct from the many relata, then it is quite obvious 
that it doesn’t make the many things one thing, unless we either again beg the question by saying that it does so because it does so, or 
embark ourselves in a vicious regress: the one-making relation makes many things one thing in virtue of a second one-making relation, 
and so on, ad infinitum (cf. Bradley, 1930, ch. II). Under the influence of Yi (1999a, 1999b, 2014), I have partially changed my previous 
stance on these matters (cf. Briceño, 2016).
7 Schaffer claims not to be “concerned” with things that are concrete but not material, or with things that exist but are non-concrete, 
such as abstracta or possibilia (cf. Schaffer, 2010, p. 33; in similar vein, Bohn, 2012; van Inwagen, 1990). In what follows, I assume, follow-
ing Williamson (2013) and pace Lewis (1986a), that we cannot make full sense of possibilia only in terms of concreta.
8 We can take them as adhering to something like the primitive sense of reality used by Fine (2001, 2009).
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This need is more or less clear: without a fundamental layer 
of being, no objects would exist, because there would be no 
ground for them. But there is at least one of them, namely: 
I, since I am thinking now. So either I am fundamental or 
I am grounded in one or many other fundamental objects. 
On the other hand, EM and EP need, as a condition of sense, 
the existence of either one or many simples. This need is also 
more or less clear: without it, no objects would exist. But 
there is at least one of them, namely: I, since I am thinking 
now. So, either one or many simples exist: either I am a sim-
ple, or there is one simple being I-lish here-ishly, or there are 
many simples arranged I-wise (cf. van Inwagen, 1990, p. 73; 
Rosen and Dorr, 2002, p. 159). 
But how can these views guarantee that their partic-
ular conditions of sense actually obtain? In what follows I 
will try to show that some of the main arguments of the 
parties involved are all equally impotent to answer the 
question. The alternatives, at most, can be presented and 
defended as equally consistent ways of saying how many 
things, apparently, might be—given certain crucial but 
quite arbitrary assumptions that presuppose already a min-
imal answer to the question. This should not be surprising. 
From the armchair we can reflect on the internal coher-
ence of these alternative views and on the conditions that 
each of them needs to meet in order to make sense at all. 
We can also clarify what possibilities represent a threat 
for the obtainment of those conditions. But we cannot tell 
what the number of things is, at least not if this is supposed 
to be necessarily true, if true at all. This seems crystal clear 
to me. But the supporters of these theses seem to think dif-
ferently. Let’s check their credentials.9 
The ways of priority and 
mereological complexity
Let’s start by examining PM and PP, who share, at least 
implicitly, the following assumptions:10
(A3)  W and the pps really exist and stand in some rela-
tion of composition.
(A4)  Composition is not identity. A whole is never iden-
tical to its parts.11
(A5)  W and the pps instantiate at least one grounding 
relation. Grounding is a relation that “imposes a 
strict partial ordering (SPO) on the entities in its 
domain: grounding is irreflexive, asymmetric, and 
transitive” (Bliss and Trogdon, 2016). This hierar-
chical metaphysical structure can be mapped in 
terms of parthood.
(A6)  Grounding is a well-founded relation: there is a fun-
damental level of being. There are no circular or 
infinite chains of grounding.12
(A7)  Fundamental objects leave no gaps and do not 
overlap. They cover the whole world in a sufficient 
and non-redundant way.
Given (A1)-(A7), PM and PP are the two jointly ex-
haustive and mutually exclusive answers to the question 
about the number of (fundamental) things. But there is an 
argument that favours PM over PP, since it puts into question 
the alleged necessary chara er of PP. This is the argument 
based on the possibility of gunk (cf. Schaffer, 2010; Sider, 1993; 
Zimmerman, 1996). 
A gunky world is a world in which everything has proper 
parts, an atomless world that enjoys mereological complexity 
all the way down. Schaffer’s version of the argument from gunk 
includes the following supplementary assumption:
(A8)  W is a unique maximal object, the one fusion of 
all the pps.13
The existence of W qua unique maximal object follows 
from the standard mereological principle of unrestricted 
composition, according to which any collection of objects 
always composes an object, a whole, namely: their fusion or 
mereological sum. This principle is also meant to be nec-
essarily true, if true at all. Thus, necessarily, the collection 
of every object composes one object. W, regardless of how 
many pps it has, is not a proper part of other object. It is a 
maximal whole.
Given (A1)-(A8), the argument goes like this: If PP is 
true, then mereological atomism is true. If mereological at-
omism is true, then it is necessarily true. But gunk is possible. 
And if gunk is possible, then PP is not necessarily true as it is 
meant to be. In contrast, if W is the one fundamental object, 
9 Each party involved has more arguments than the ones I will discuss here. Those arguments typically appeal to empirical considerations 
and theoretical virtues such as parsimony or explanatory power. I cannot address all these considerations here. I have chosen those 
arguments that seem to me most typically metaphysical and more central to the debate. These arguments aspire to convince with inde-
pendence of those other secondary considerations.
10 These assumptions are made explicit by Schaffer (2010), and I follow him closely; but they can also be traced in Lewis’s “Humean 
Supervenience” thesis, once we qualify it (cf. supra, fn 3; Lewis, 1986a, 1986b).
11 Cf. supra, fn 6. If whole and parts are distinct things, we are pressed to give an account of how they are so intimately related. This is 
precisely what PM and PP attempt to do in the next assumptions.
12 (A5)-(A6) express a dominant way of understanding grounding. Cf. Bliss and Trogdon (2016), and Correia and Schnieder (2012).
13 Note that PM does not understand W as a set of objects. First, because sets are abstracta, not concreta. Second, because according to 
standard set theory (Zermelo-Frankel), there is no such thing as a unique maximal set, since for every number of objects there is always 
a set containing a greater number of objects.
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as PM claims, the possibility of gunk can be accommodated. 
Since, given assumptions (A1)-(A8), PM is the only other al-
ternative to PP, then PM is true, and necessarily so.14
Mereological atomism receives support from (A1) 
and (A6) and from the fact that a view that admits many 
non-overlapping middle-sized composite objects as funda-
mental seems to be intolerably arbitrary, because at what 
molecular level should we draw the line to distribute the priv-
ileges of fundamentality? It is no coincidence that our most 
consistent pluralists have been atomists. Arguments for the 
metaphysical possibility of gunk are also available. Gunk has 
been conceived in logically consistent ways (e.g., Descartes, 
1985, II.20). Gunk seems also to be an empirically open sce-
nario and science sometimes seems to point in that direc-
tion (cf. Schaffer, 2003, with references). Finally, mereology 
has coherent gunky models (cf. Simons, 1987, § 1.6). Thus, it 
seems that PM, unlike PP, can offer an object that is not a 
proper part of other object, an object that is capable of ac-
commodating the possibility of gunk and, alternatively, the 
possibility of mereological atomism. Of course, the argument 
only works under the supplementary assumption that W is a 
maximal whole—(A8). Otherwise, such a whole would not 
be basic: it would be a proper part of other object, so it would 
overlap with it and would need supplementation to cover ev-
erything—contra (A7).
The argument is valid, but doubtfully sound. Its weak-
ness surely lies at the heart of its assumptions. Let’s start with 
the last one introduced by PM: (A8).
By hypothesis, the supporter of PP accepts (A1)-(A7). 
However, why should he also accept (A8)? Isn’t PM just 
begging the question, or at least taking for granted a very im-
portant part of the answer by the mere stipulation of (A8)? 
After all, there seems to be no privileged reason to assume 
the existence of one maximal object as an axiom rather than 
assuming the existence of many minimal objects as a distinct 
axiom. So, as a first objection, the supporter of PP might at-
tempt to even the score. While PM may introduce as an ax-
iom the existence of a maximal object, PP can introduce as 
an axiom the existence of many minimal objects, i.e., many 
mereological simples or atoms, through an alternative supple-
mentary assumption:
(A9)  There are many minimal pps that compose both W 
and every other composite object.
Obviously, (A9) is not a proof of PP simpliciter but only 
the (key!) assumption of the existence of many minimal ob-
jects, just like (A8) is not a proof of PM simpliciter, but only the 
(key!) assumption of the existence of one maximal object. PM 
and PP are both intere ed in what grounds what. But if PM 
can introduce (A8) to grant the existence of a maximal object 
and then argue for a top-down direction of priority, there is 
no reason why PP shouldn’t be allowed to introduce (A9) to 
grant the existence of many minimal objects and then argue 
for a bottom-up direction of priority. PM might complain and 
say that PP cannot exclude the possibility of gunk by decree, so 
there must be something wrong in assuming (A9). Of course 
it seems wrong to exclude the possibility of gunk by decree! 
But then, for the very same reason, PP might complain against 
PM. After all, PM is also using a decree (namely, the product 
of (A2) and the possibility of gunk) to exclude the possibility 
of mereological simples, and another decree (namely, (A8)) to 
include a maximal object that excludes an analogous possibili-
ty to that of gunk, namely: the possibility of junk.
A junky world is a world in which everything is a proper 
part of something else, a world that is not a maximal whole, 
a world that enjoys mereological complexity all the way up. 
In a junky world there is no such thing as the fusion of every-
thing. And since a junky world still has mereological structure, 
only some form of restricted composition can take place (cf. 
Bohn, 2009a, 2009b). Thus, a junky world is irreducibly plu-
ral.15 While a gunky world lacks minimal parts, a junky world 
lacks a maximal whole. And the metaphysical possibility of 
junk seems straightforward. In fact, junk has been conceived 
in logically consistent ways (e.g., Descartes, 1985, II.21); its 
existence also seems to be an empirically open scenario, and 
science, now and then, has pointed in that direction (as the 
history of science shows, the pendulum seems to go back and 
forth, from a closed universe to an open universe; cf. Koyré, 
1957); and mereology has coherent non-standard models for 
it (cf. Bohn, 2009a, 2009b, 2012; Simons, 1987, ch. 2). 
Thus, PP can raise the argument of the possibility of 
junk against PM in more or less the same fashion as PM rais-
es the argument of the possibility of gunk against PP. In fact, 
admitting (A1)-(A7) as a common ground, PP can introduce 
(A9) instead of (A8) and then argue in the opposite direction: 
If PM is true, then W is a unique maximal object. If W is a 
unique maximal object, then it is necessarily so. But junk is 
possible. And if junk is possible, then PM is not necessarily 
true as it is meant to be. In contrast, if the fundamental pps are 
mereological simples, as PP claims, then the possibility of junk 
can be accommodated. Since, given assumptions (A1)-(A7) 
and (A9), PP is the only alternative to PM, then PP is true, 
and necessarily so.16
14 Similar paths can be found in Schaffer (2010), Bohn (2012), Horgan and Potrcˇ (2008, p. 188-189), and Sider (1993; though see his 2013, 
where he regrets it).
15 So, strictly speaking, the expression “junky world” is just bad grammar or a covered way to say something different from what the 
surface grammar suggests. Since the predicate “junky” can only be applied to many things, the term “world” in the expression “junky 
world” cannot refer to one individual: it is, under the surface, a plural term that refers to many individuals (cf. Bohn, 2012; Simons, 2003; 
van Fraassen, 1995).
16 Similar paths can be found in Bohn (2009a, 2009b, 2012), Morganti (2009) and Tallant (2013).
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The possibility of junk points to the heart of PM. Because 
if the world is junky, then there is no maximal whole, since every 
whole is always a proper part of some other whole. And if one is 
willing to accept the possibility of gunk, then there are no princi-
pled reasons for rejecting the possibility of junk. In fact, on what 
grounds should PP accept W as being maximal instead of junky? 
If PM can assume (A8), why shouldn’t PP be allowed to assume 
(A9)? This is not to defend (A9) in itself. As far as I can see, (A9) 
is as dogmatic as (A8), and, therefore, equally unjustified (at least 
neither maximal nor minimal things belong to Moorean ap-
pearances; their existence is not obvious or evident). My point 
is that if we want to treat both PM and PP with fairness, then 
we must either allow or reject both assumptions. Both a gunky 
world and a junky world are logically consistent and conceivable, 
so they both seem metaphysically possible; and they both seem 
equally compatible with the shared assumptions. Yet they can-
not be both metaphysically possible if PM or PP are meant to 
be necessarily true, if true at all. It is true that PP is threatened 
by the possibility of gunk. This is a scenario that mereology tol-
erates but that PP, qua ontology, is forced to reject in order to 
make sense. In contrast, it is true that PM is threatened by the 
possibility of junk, a scenario that mereology also tolerates but 
that PM, qua ontology, must reject in order to make sense. Prima 
facie, PM and PP are on a par. They both accept a layered ontol-
ogy and the idea that either the top or the bottom layer must 
be fundamental. So, the most we can do is to honour (A6) and 
insist that there must be a fundamental level, either a maximal 
whole (W) or many minimal parts (all the minimal pps). But the 
crucial problem is which one. Since there is no principled way to 
choose between (A8) and (A9), there is no non-arbitrary reason 
to prefer PM over PP, or vice-versa (cf. Tallant, 2013). 
If we include both (A8) and (A9), then the arguments 
from gunk and junk don’t cut any ice, because both the possibili-
ty of gunk and the possibility of junk are excluded from the start 
by two distinct decrees, and the real dispute is only about the 
direction of priority, on which, without additional arguments, 
we are still in the dark. In contrast, the exclusion of both would 
mean admitting the joint possibility of gunk and junk and, 
thereby, the admission that, possibly, there is neither a maxi-
mal whole nor many minimal parts. This would mean giving 
up (A6), a crucial assumption common to both PM and PP. So 
what? Why not indeed give up (A6), and, consequently, both 
(A8) and (A9), i.e., the myth of a fundamental level? It seems 
that there is nothing wrong with the possibility of a world that 
is both gunky and junky, that is, a world that lacks a fundamen-
tal level, either top or bottom. Bohn (2009a) has explored this 
joint possibility—which he labels “hunk”—in a convincing way. 
A hunky world has no minimal parts and is not a max-
imal whole; it is just many infinite composites.17 Now, if this 
means that nothing has ultimate ground, so be it. There is 
nothing inconsistent with this possibility, since it is just the 
conjunction of two, prima facie, compatible possibilities: gunk 
and junk. Call this view Hunky Pluralism (HP). 
I cannot explore this alternative in depth, but here is a 
hint of an argument in favour of it: If (A6) is true, then, nec-
essarily, there is a fundamental level, either a maximal whole 
or many minimal parts, so either gunk is impossible or junk is 
impossible. But, as shown before, possibly, W is gunky. And, as 
also shown before, possibly, W is junky. Since there seems to be 
nothing against the joint possibility of gunk and junk, except 
the myth encapsulated by (A6), possibly, W is both gunky and 
junky (i.e., hunky). That is, possibly, (A6) is false, and PM and 
PP are not necessarily true as they are meant to be. Therefore, 
possibly, HP is true, and necessarily so.
But can we tell who’s actually right, PM, PP, or HP? A cer-
tain pattern seems to take place in the arguments just examined. 
What is notorious about them is their minimal power to show 
the fundamental cardinality of W directly, without dogmatic ax-
ioms and detours in the modal space. The argument from gunk 
does not prove that there is a maximal whole, nor that ground-
ing holds between concrete material objects, nor that grounding 
must end somewhere. All these claims are assumed as axioms. 
Similarly with the argument from junk. Neither PM nor PP can 
go directly for what they want: they need to make heavy loaded 
assumptions, fix those that are more convenient for their pur-
poses, and then offer a deductive proof that runs, more or less 
trivially, from the possibility of something to the necessity of 
their own preferred alternative. Following van Fraassen’s analo-
gy, these assumptions play the role of Descartes’s God: they are 
 ecially designed to guarantee that what follows from them is 
true (cf. van Fraassen, 2002, p. 1). In fact, the parties just seem 
to be playing puzzle-solving after agreeing on some posits, con-
structs or simulacra, namely: W, the pps, (A1)-(A9). The argu-
ment for HP is less dogmatic, but equally uninformative. It illus-
trates that if we free ourselves from some dogmas (e.g., (A6)), 
it might well be the case that HP is another possibility that we 
have overlooked. This possibility does not entail by itself the 
impossibility of PM or PP. This is done by (A1), which makes 
them incompatible possibilities. This should make us think: ha-
ven’t we overlooked still other possibilities simply because we 
have wrongly assumed from the start—blindly following their 
supporters—that the claims of PM, PP, and HP are suitable can-
didates for being necessarily true, if true at all?
The ways of real existence and 
mereological simplicity
We can have a more clear diagnosis about the reasons of 
this apparent metaphysical embarrassment if we examine EM 
and EP. These two views embrace compositional nihilism and 
they immediately put into question the truth of (A3)-(A9). 
According to them, no parthood relations ever obtain, so W 
lacks mereological structure. Therefore, no grounding relations 
between concrete material objects, mapped in terms of part-
hood, ever obtain. Concrete material objects do not stand in a 
17 Again, surface grammar may bewitch us: “a hunky world” designates not one thing, but many things (Cf. supra, fn. 15).
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hierarchical order based on mereological composition. They live 
together in an egalitarian level of real existence. Those that really 
exist are thereby exclusionary: either there are many of them or 
there is only one of them. Thus, instead of (A3)-(A9), we can say 
that EP and EM endorse the following common assumptions:
(A10)  There is, really, only one concrete material simple, 
or, alternatively, there are, really, many concrete 
material simples. Otherwise, there would be no 
objects at all.
(A11)  An object only composes itself. No proper part-
hood relations obtain.18
(A12)  No grounding relations between objects, mapped 
in terms of parthood, obtain.
Given (A1), (A2), and (A10)-(A12), here is a trivial ar-
gument for EM: If EM is true, then it is necessarily so. And 
if EP is true, then it is necessarily so. It seems that the real 
existence of one exclusionary concrete material simple is pos-
sible.19 If the real existence of one exclusionary concrete ma-
terial simple is possible, then EP is not necessarily true as it is 
meant to be. In contrast, if EM is true, then the possibility of 
there being, really, one exclusionary concrete material simple 
can be accommodated. Since, given the assumptions, EM is 
the only alternative to EP, then EM is true, and necessarily so.
However, given (A1), (A2), and (A10)-(A12), EP can 
reply in a trivial way: If EM is true, then it is necessarily so. 
And if EP is true, then it is necessarily so. It seems that the real 
existence of many exclusionary concrete material simples is 
possible.20 If the real existence of many exclusionary concrete 
material simples is possible, then EM is not necessarily true as 
it is meant to be. In contrast, if EP is true, then the possibility 
of there being, really, many exclusionary concrete material sim-
ples can be accommodated. Since, given the assumptions, EP is 
the only alternative to EM, then EP is true, and necessarily so. 
Infinite cardinality of concrete material atoms might be 
admitted, but since there are only simples, there is no mereo-
logical complexity that can give place to gunk or junk. Quan-
tification is either over one or over many simples, but never 
over composites. Certainly, one can also quantify over sets, but 
these are abstra a; or over fictions of composition, but these 
are not real existents. 
So the debate between EM and EP cannot be settled 
unless one, from the very beginning, incorporates one of the 
following additional assumptions, just like PM and PP do in 
their own way:
(A13)  There is, really, only one concrete material simple.
Or, alternatively:
(A14)  There are, really, many concrete material simples.
But these assumptions cannot be accepted. Taking 
both for granted is contradictory. Taking only one of them 
for granted is to beg the question. Now, in order to re ect 
the common assumption, (A10), we must remain open and 
conclude that either EM or EP is true. But which one?! Nei-
ther of them is evident or obviously true: Moorean appear-
ances are not populated neither by one nor by many simples. 
And we remain clueless if we keep testing them in the modal 
space. Because if we keep doing so, we can legitimately ask: 
Why don’t we give up (A10), and, therefore, both (A13) and 
(A14)? This would mean that, possibly, there are, really, no 
concrete material objects whatsoever (because, possibly, nei-
ther EM nor EP are true). So what? Is the possibility of there 
being, really, no concrete material objects whatsoever some-
how logically inconsistent or inconceivable? Not at all. So far, 
we have presupposed their real existence. Sure, I think, I am, 
so at least some concrete object exists. But this doesn’t mean 
that some concrete material object exists, let alone that this 
claim is necessarily true, if true at all. Firstly, logic and mere-
ology, as formal systems, are supposed to be neutral on wheth-
er the objects of quantification are material or immaterial.21 
18 Horgan and Potrcˇ (2008, ch. 7) claim that our world is an object that lacks proper parts. In parallel, they invite us to take it as gunky. 
This is wrong. If our world lacks parts, then it is an extended simple; if it is gunky, then it is partite all the way down, a vast jello that lacks 
atomic parts but, nonetheless, has non-atomic parts.
19 See the references before when I introduced EM. All those philosophers have conceived it in a logically consistent way (no matter 
how shocking to common sense); hence, it seems metaphysically possible. E.g., Rea (2001) takes space-time to be one extended simple.
20 See the references before when I introduced EP. All those philosophers have conceived it in a logically consistent way (no matter 
how shocking to common sense); hence, it seems metaphysically possible. E.g., Sider (2013) has argued for a world in which the only 
concrete material objects are space-time points.
21 I understand “formal” as Husserl did (cf. Husserl, 2001, p. 19-20, 39-41). Formal systems (e.g., logic, set theory, mereology) are 
supposed to be topic-neutral; they attempt to draw laws and general principles that are supposed to hold for a domain of entities, re-
gardless of the nature of these. I am not claiming that logic and mereology are free from metaphysical presuppositions. What I do claim 
is that we should always keep this in mind and always try to make those presuppositions explicit. For start, we should always keep in 
mind that all formal systems rest at least on one obvious metaphysical presupposition, which is not always made explicit: that of singular 
existence. As Leonard puts it, “modern logic tacitly presupposes singular existence for its singular term variables, just as the traditional 
logic tacitly presupposed general existence for its general term variables” (Leonard, 1956, p. 56). In fact, logic only has a symbol for 
singular existence. It really presupposes that the “x” in “∃!x” designates something at all. My complaint is that the parties of the debate 
about the world’s cardinality tend to present themselves as arguing for something much more substantial than what they are in fact 
arguing for. Because most of the weight of the arguments they present for their respective views is really carried by the metaphysical 
presuppositions embraced by them prior to any of the arguments they deploy. Once you embrace those metaphysical presuppositions, 
the logical and mereological consequences that follow from them are more or less trivial.
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Secondly, there is nothing that can stop us from conceiving 
in a logically consistent way a world of concrete immaterial 
objects; we just need to remember that idealism, in some or 
other form, was once the dominant metaphysics, and it wasn’t 
defeated for being inconceivable or logically contradictory. 
Hence, it is metaphysically possible that there are, really, no 
concrete material objects at all.22
In fact, we can give a general argument that goes against 
(A10)–and, therefore, against (A13) and (A14): If EM is 
true, then it is necessarily true. And if EP is true, then it is 
necessarily true. But, possibly, as shown before, EM is false; 
hence, not necessarily true as it is meant to be. And, possibly, 
as shown before, EP is also false; hence, not necessarily true 
as it is meant to be. So, possibly, both EM and EP are false; 
hence, not necessarily true as they are meant to be. Therefore, 
possibly, there are, really, no concrete material objects at all. 
But since there is, really, at least one concrete object, because 
at least I exist, then there is, really, at least one concrete but 
immaterial object. 
According to the last possibility explored, all real con-
crete objects are immaterial. All material objects are fictions, 
illusions or the like. This possibility might be realised in five 
different ways—which correspond to the idealistic counter-
parts of the five different ways in which the implicit presup-
position that there is, really, at least one concrete material 
object was realised—, namely: Priority Idealistic Monism 
(PIM), Priority Idealistic Pluralism (PIP), Existence Idealis-
tic Monism (EIM), Existence Idealistic Pluralism (EIP), and 
Hunky Idealistic Pluralism (HIP). It does not take too long to 
think of historical figures that have conceived logically con-
sistent versions of these alternatives. One just need to take 
a quick look to Dunham et al. (2011) or to any anthology of 
Eastern philosophy to find a good number of examples.
What might be wrong?
I think we have reached rock bottom. We have been 
bringing more possible answers to the light. And we have 
been capable of doing so insofar as we have been capable of 
giving up some dogmatic assumptions. The fact that the range 
of metaphysically possible alternatives is wider than what we 
first thought seems to point to a central problem of the de-
bate about fundamental cardinality as it is pra ised today. 
The parties explicitly assume that metaphysical claims are 
necessarily true, if true at all, and that claims about the num-
ber of things are metaphysical claims. But then they, dogmat-
ically, restrict the domain of quantification to our real concrete 
material objects. This restriction may well be re ectable ac-
cording to the Zeitgeist, but certainly cannot be embraced as a 
matter of principle, at least not under the standard settled by 
(A2), which fixes, allegedly, the limits of rational, thinkable, 
metaphysical enquiry. If they insist on (A1), then they should 
make their claims of cardinality under the presupposition 
that they are quantifying in absolutely unrestricted terms. 
Otherwise, their claims will fail when te ed against other 
conceivable and logically consistent alternatives. That is what 
doing first-order ontology amounts to. But they don’t do that. 
They do not say, for instance, that absolutely everything is real, 
concrete and material. They presuppose the existence of 
things like these and also want to remain neutral or indifferent 
on whether there are other things apart from these. So, loudly, 
they announce that they are making first-order metaphysical 
claims, all of which are meant to be necessarily true, if true at 
all; but, whi ering, they restrict the existential quantifier to 
a domain of objects that doesn’t even pretend to be absolutely 
everything. It should not be surprising, then, that unattend-
ed possibilities pose a threat to these views. Once these views 
are te ed in the modal space, as views that are making abso-
lute/ unrestricted/ necessary claims, they reveal themselves 
as what they really are: views that are making only relative/ 
restricted/ contingent claims. So, their supporters are forced 
to either admit defeat or admit that they were not, after 
all, making metaphysical claims, at least not if metaphysical 
claims are meant to be necessarily true, if true at all. The last 
argument shows what has been out of sight. By the very fact 
of stating it, we can anticipate that the remaining alternatives 
(PIM, PIP, EIM, EIP, and HIP) could also be challenged by 
putting into question their pretensions of necessity, following 
what is now a familiar pattern. This pattern would help us to 
e ablish that, since it is conceivable and logically consistent, it 
is metaphysically possible that there are, really, no concrete ob-
jects at all, not even immaterial ones (after all, the model has 
only presupposed the real existence of at least one of these).23
The likely rejoinder would be the following: “well, I 
think, I am, so at least something concrete exists”. But this 
claim, in turn, could be refuted by saying: “true, but <I think, 
I am> is not a necessary truth, since I could have not existed”. 
22 I am not saying that the conceivability of there being no concrete material objects entails that it is metaphysically possible that there 
are no concrete material objects. What I am saying is that the conceivability of such scenario plus the fact that it also seems a contradic-
tion-free scenario are, jointly, very good reasons, perhaps the best expressible, thinkable reasons available to us, for taking it indeed as 
a metaphysically possible scenario. Recall (A2).
23 It is not difficult to entertain such a possibility following what seems to be the perfectly sound and valid route of substraction argu-
ments that toy with the iterated possibility of removing any member from a world that consists in a finite domain of distinct concrete 
objects that do not depend on each other to exist (cf. Baldwin, 1996; Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2013). But I do not want to limit myself to this 
single route to defend the metaphysical possibility of there being no concrete objects at all. Because substraction arguments are not 
available when we are in front of worlds that consist in domains of objects that do depend on each other to exist (e.g., Whiteheadian 
actual occasions or worlds where there is massive overlapping of objects), or when the domain in question is infinite (e.g., gunky or junky 
worlds). These worlds do not fit the requirements demanded by substraction arguments for their annihilation. Yet it still seems perfectly 
conceivable and logically possible that any of those worlds could be wiped out all at once.
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The fact that <I think, I am> is always true while being enter-
tained or uttered by the thinker does not grant the necessary 
existence of the thinker. This last reply can only be defused by 
showing that I am a necessary existent. And I see two ways 
of doing this: 
(a)  The first alternative is to embrace a form of Spi-
nozism. I am a necessary concrete existent, some-
thing whose mere concept or idea entails its con-
crete existence. I am God.
(b)  The second alternative is to embrace a metaphys-
ics according to which all objects are necessary 
existents, that is, “it is necessary that everything is 
such that it is necessary that something is identical 
with it” (Williamson, 2013, p. 2). To make sense 
of all propositions, the proposal is to distribute ex-
istence generously among all possible objects, so 
then we can distinguish between the existence of 
something qua possibilium (which is necessary) and 
the existence of something qua concretum (which 
is contingent). Because, according to Williamson’s 
reasoning, if the proposition <I do not exist> is true, 
then both the proposition and myself as a constitu-
ent of it must exist. So, necessarily, if I do not exist, 
I exist. So, necessarily, I exist. What happens is that, 
possibly, I am not concrete. If this position is right, 
then everything is a necessary existent qua possibil-
ium, but only a contingent existent qua concretum 
(cf. Williamson, 2002).
Needless to say, none of these alternatives gives us too 
much hope. First, regarding alternative (a), I know of no 
sound ontological argument that proves the necessary con-
crete existence of something. And certainly I know of no 
sound ontological argument that shows, in addition, that I am 
precisely that thing (!). If there are indeed sound arguments in 
this direction, they must show that the following prima facie 
plausible scenarios are, against the spirit of (A2), metaphysi-
cal impossibilities: that there could be no concrete existents; 
and that, even if there were a necessary concrete existent, I 
could be a distinct thing, a contingent concrete existent.
Second, as regarding alternative (b), it is obviously less 
contentious, but its pretensions are also less ambitious. It sim-
ply says that all possible logical objects, that all possibilia, are 
necessary existents. This view does not tell us anything about 
whether concrete existents are many or one, and it assumes 
that concrete existence is a contingent feature. So far as it 
goes, the view is consistent with the claim that there could 
have been nothing concrete at all; hence, I am not a necessary 
concrete existent. At the most, the view entails the impossi-
bility of there being absolutely nothing at all, since, according 
to it, non-concrete things, such as possibilia, are something, 
and they exist necessarily.
Third, neither of these two forms of necessitism seems 
able to exclude the threat of the following metaphysical pos-
sibilities: (i) that what alternative (a) takes to be a necessary 
concrete existent might not be a real necessary concrete ex-
istent, but only a fiction or illusion of a necessary concrete 
existent, a purely intentional object; (ii) that what alternative 
(b) takes to be necessary existent possibilia might not be real 
necessary existent possibilia, but only fictions or illusions of 
necessary existent possibilia, some purely intentional objects; 
and (iii) that, against the claims of alternatives (a) and (b), it 
seems that there could have been nothing at all. And by “nothing 
at all” I mean not even the proposition that there is nothing 
at all, not even the mere appearance, fiction or illusion of a 
necessary existent possibilium. 
Sure, this last possibility is obviously incompatible with 
(A1) and the fact that I am something that thinks, exists 
now. But why should we indeed accept (A1)? Why should 
we expect singular existence to be guaranteed in even stronger 
terms than those that Descartes ever conceived? Semantical 
considerations as those deployed by Williamson (2002, 2013) 
seem not enough to show that all objects are real necessary 
existents. What those considerations reveal is prior ontologi-
cal commitment to those things. This strategy begs the ques-
tion in favour of those who, like Williamson himself, think 
that ontology is real and necessary. It puts the cart before the 
horse: why, after all, should anyone accept a semantics that 
prejudges in favour of a determinate metaphysics (cf. Al-
varado, 2017)? Clearly, no semantical considerations would 
convince anyone to believe in a certain metaphysics unless 
that person is already convinced of such metaphysics. Some 
examples might help. The development of plural logic will 
not convince the Eleatic monist of the real existence of many 
things. The deployment of distinct quantifiers will not con-
vince the Spinozist that they really pick out distinct things, 
since, according to him, the sentences “some things are F”, “ev-
erything is F”, and “there is a unique thing that is F” say, really, 
just the same. And the development of mereology will not 
convince the compositional nihilist about the real existence 
of partite wholes and proper parts. In sum, just by changing 
a few words, we could say against Williamson’s real necessary 
existent possibilia what Bentham said against natural rights: “a 
reason for wishing that a certain right were e ablished, is not 
that right—want is not supply—hunger is not bread” (Bur-
ton, 1843, p. 67).
What our modal thought and discourse do seem to show 
is that thinkers like us are committed to intentional objects. 
But these objects might well be unreal, that is purely inten-
tional objects, mere theoretical posits, subjective projections, 
fictions or illusions. The fact that I can follow Williamson’s 
(2002) argument—which starts claiming that “necessarily, if 
I do not exist then the proposition that I do not exist is true”, 
and ends up inferring that I, necessarily, exist, although, pos-
sibly, I am not concrete—certainly cannot guarantee my own 
real necessary existence. The fact that our modal thought and 
discourse demands the existence of possibilia in order to make 
sense is not a reason for transforming what seems to be, pri-
ma facie, a conceptual, epistemic or linguistic necessity into a 
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metaphysical necessity. Sure, if all propositions are real nec-
essary existents, I can infer my own real necessary existence 
from a proposition about me. But this holds, again, under an 
ontological presupposition: if propositions are real necessary 
existents. Yet I see no compelling metaphysical considerations 
to accept the idea that the existence (simpliciter) of something 
like a proposition about me, or about any other object, can 
exclude the possibility of my non-existence (simpliciter), or 
of any other object. The exclusion of this possibility can only 
be done by answering the perennial question of why there 
is (simpliciter) something rather than nothing by appealing 
to the following sufficient reason: because it is impossible for 
there to be nothing (simpliciter). However, just like metaphys-
ical nihilism about concreta seems possible, I am prepared to 
accept that absolute metaphysical nihilism, that is, that there 
is nothing at all whatsoever, not even aletic or propositional 
reality, also seems possible. Of course, such a scenario is inef-
fable, because from the very minute we attempt to think or 
express the possibility of absolute metaphysical nihilism we are 
trapped in self-contradiction. Just like the thinker that claims 
<I do not exist> commits a self-refutation, the proposition 
<there is nothing at all> is self-contradictory if the scope of 
“nothing at all” is meant to be absolutely unrestricted and pre-
tends to cover, among all other things, itself. But paradoxes in-
volving self-reference affect any thought with global scope (as 
metaphysical thought aspires to be): one cannot think about 
the alleged limits of thought without crossing them (cf. Priest, 
1995). However, the aporia to which absolute metaphysical ni-
hilism seems to lead us is not dissolved by insisting that, nec-
essarily, everything really exists, or by admitting that reality is 
contradictory (pace Priest). The aporia simply reveals that we 
cannot think or say what can only be shown; that when we 
try to state the ineffable we end up stating nonsense.24 Now, if 
absolute metaphysical nihilism is inconceivable or inexpress-
ible in contradiction-free terms, then we either have to deny 
that it is a genuine metaphysical possibility or we need to give 
up (A2). So what? Why don’t we give up (A2) at this point? 
If we cannot conceive it or express it, perhaps the scenario can 
be shown or sugge ed by analogy with the status of the cogito. 
It seems clear that although <I think, I am> is true whenever 
uttered or thought by me, its truth does not guarantee my 
necessary existence qua concretum. Similarly, although I ex-
ist invariantly whenever there are propositions about myself, 
this does not guarantee that those propositions, nor their con-
stituents (myself included), are, really, necessary existents. 
I do not question that some metaphysical claims, like 
those that unravel essences, or those that assert the cardinali-
ty and composition of some presupposed things, are necessar-
ily true, if true at all. For instance, given the existence (simplic-
iter) of three non-identical things, e.g., you, I, and the whole 
[you+I], we can say that all the following claims are necessarily 
true, if true at all: I am one thing; you are one thing; you and I 
are two things; the whole [you+ I] is one thing composed of two 
things; I am what I am (say, a human being); you are what you 
are (say, another human being); the whole [you+I] is what it 
is (say, the whole that has you and I as proper parts).25 But the 
metaphysical views discussed above, if metaphysical at all, are 
first-order views that can only aspire to be contingently true, 
if true at all.26 
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investigation that attempts to say what exists, that is, whether there are instances of certain ontological categories, whether those in-
stances are one or many, etc. On the other hand, analytic ontology, the branch that I think most fertile and gratifying, attempts to give 
conceptual analyses of certain ontological categories without saying whether they have or not any instances. It proceeds a priori, usually 
through transcendental deductions, attempting to answer under what conditions a concept F could have an instance. It is second-order 
ontology. Its results are typically stated in claims that have a definitional form, that is, claims that unravel essences or make explicit the 
internal structure of a concept, showing its interconnections with other essences or concepts. The true claims of analytic ontology are 
conceptual necessities. In analytic ontology, the branch that gives its back to Quine’s meta-ontology, there is still room for necessities.
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